Goldstein reveals the beliefs underlying political psychology, thereby siding with the position of radical constructivism. I argue that the epistemological implications presented in the article ….

Open peer commentary on the article “Ontology, Reality and Construction in Niklas Luhmann’s Theory” by Krzysztof C. Matuszek. Upshot: I discuss the conception of “reality” that Matuszek attributed to Luhmann’s work and the influence of “ontology” on his thought. It is argued that Luhmann’s system theory is based on the distinction system/environment and not on an ontological principle.

Open peer commentary on the article “Ontology, Reality and Construction in Niklas Luhmann’s Theory” by Krzysztof C. Matuszek. Upshot: The question of whether contingency can be limited concerns the foundations of sociological systems theory as a theory of cognition. This commentary argues that while such limits may seem plausible and apparent at first, they would consequentially give rise to an ontological notion of society within society. Rather, the commentary proposes to understand the limits identified in the target article (...) as social functions structuring expectations in situations of double contingency. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Ontology, Reality and Construction in Niklas Luhmann’s Theory” by Krzysztof C. Matuszek. Upshot: On an epistemological level, Matuszek argues convincingly that Luhmann’s epistemological ambiguities could be embedded in a coherent constructivist approach. However, what do we gain by being assured of this and why is it so difficult to tolerate ambiguities in an otherwise highly elaborated theory?

Open peer commentary on the article “Ontology, Reality and Construction in Niklas Luhmann’s Theory” by Krzysztof C. Matuszek. Upshot: Matuszek’s article criticizes Luhmann’s systems theory in particular and constructivism in general with respect to philosophical inconsistency caused by some ontological implications of constructivist epistemology. Providing a coherent interpretation of ontology and epistemology is worth the effort in order to solve philosophical problems. However, the question arises of whether philosophical reasoning actually is of any relevance for empirical research. (...) I argue that both Luhmann’s operative constructivism and constructivism in general already comply with Matuszek’s suggestions. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Ontology, Reality and Construction in Niklas Luhmann’s Theory” by Krzysztof C. Matuszek. Upshot: Matuszek omits the decisive notions of autology and re-entry in order to construe and subsequently find Luhmann’s ontology. What is more, the whole endeavour to discover ontology in Luhmann’s work is questionable. It misses the point that a systems theory based on operative constructivism is obviously developed for researching ontogenetic processes.

Open peer commentary on the article “Ontology, Reality and Construction in Niklas Luhmann’s Theory” by Krzysztof C. Matuszek. Upshot: Matuszek’s article points to some ambiguities in Luhmann’s late work, but the reinterpretations he offers suffer from various sociological and philosophical difficulties. By elaborating on the relevance of time in Luhmann’s operational constructivism, this commentary opens up some alternative interpretations.

Open peer commentary on the article “Ontology, Reality and Construction in Niklas Luhmann’s Theory” by Krzysztof C. Matuszek. Upshot: Matuszek’s article is about the way Luhmann reshaped but failed to eliminate ontology. I try to contribute with some thoughts about how Luhmann’s theory is in fact based on certain ontological assumptions.

Context: In the literature concerning the theory of social systems, interest in epistemological and ontological questions has increased in recent years. The controversies regarding a realist vs. constructivist interpretation of Luhmann’s theory, as well as the concept of many realities that correspond to many ontologies, deserve attention. Problem: The paper discusses interrelated ontological and epistemological problems in Luhmann’s systems theory, such as ontology and de-ontologization, realism vs. constructivism, contingency and its limits and one vs. many realities. Method: The paper proposes (...) an interpretation, according to which systems theory is based on an epistemology - radical operative constructivism. Results: Luhmann is not a realist. The last word belongs to radical operative constructivism, and naïve realism with reference to social systems has only a preliminary, methodological significance. However, taking a position in the dispute between realism and constructivism inevitably involves an ontological “vocabulary,” that is, usage of the reality/construction distinction. Furthermore, operative constructivism formulates the necessary conditions of the possibility of cognition, which limit the contingency of the theory and constitute one reality that is a construction of systems theory. Luhmann rejects ontology, but he does not renounce epistemology, and consequently the project of de-ontologization remains incomplete. Implications: The paper offers a new, coherent interpretation of ontological and epistemological questions in Luhmann’s theory, and also throws light on some problems of radical constructivism in general, such as the ontological implications of epistemology or the constructivist self-reference of theories. Key words: Radical operative constructivism, social systems, Luhmann, ontology, reality, contingency. (shrink)

Upshot: The commentaries concentrate mostly on ontological issues but overlook the main epistemological argument in my target article. This argument refers to the conditions that make cognition possible, and to the limits of cognition. These are important for two reasons: they have ontological consequences and they limit the theory’s contingency.

Veissière et al. disrupt current debates over the nature of mindreading by bringing multiple positions under the umbrella of free-energy. However, it is not clear whether integrating the opposing sides under a common formal framework will yield new insights into how mindreading is achieved, rather than offering a mere redescription of the target phenomenon.

Pour autant que nous lisions Sade dans la perspective de la métaphysique platonicienne, il nous apparaít comme un scélérat psychopathe, dont l'oeuvre est digne de bûcher. Car si ses romans sont le reflet de la réalité, il n'у a pas de justification pour lui. Mais le monde sadique, prétend-il, en effet, à être une copie du monde réel, dont l'existence n'est encore que potentielle? Faut-il alors craindre Sade et le prendre pour un fou en le mettant sous le boisseau? L'analyse (...) de la conscience sadique enlève des doutes et des hésitations qui naissent en nous. Sade n'est pas aliené dans le sens que nous voulions imputer. D'un coté la perversion, de l'autre coté l'experience à laquelle il soumet, sous la pression des forces obscures, sa propre conscience, excluent les raisons de nos accusations. L'oeuvre de Sade est, en vérité, une manifestation de ce que G. Deleuze a nommé "renversement du platonisme". En tant que telle elle se développe en dehors de la distinction platonicienne fondamentale: Originel - Copie, en devenant une évocation du troisiéme "élément platonicien" - "faux prétendant", soit du Simulacre. С'ést en "faux" ou "simulé" qu elle retrouve sa vérité. Ce contexte permet de traiter Sade comme un grand precurseur de Nietzsche et de voir en lui un penseur anticipant beaucoup de problibnes actuels de la philosophie contemporaine, comme par exemple le problème du nihilisme. Le systeme sadique c'ést une singuliére synthése qui se compose, en outre de "motifs nietzschéennes", d'un mécanisme du siécle des lumiéres et d'une philosophie kantienne de volonté, alors de deux conceptions antinomiques de la pensée du XVIIIе siécle. Done on ne peut pas exagérer en disant que Sade est un penseur traversant son époque et ouvrant des horisons nouveaux devant la "philosophie de l'homme". II est très significatif que le dévoilement de ces horizons n'est pas pour Sade un effort exclusivemant théorique, mais qu'il est une tentative d'une dimension pratique. Ses solutions philosophiques, Sade les paye de la géhenne de sa propre conscience, qui, tourmenté par la nécessité d'une négation, culmine en anéantir un proche ainsi que soi-méme. (shrink)

Choć teorie C.G. Junga i J. Hillmana były już dogłębnie analizowane w licznych tekstach, prezentowany artykuł ma na celu wprowadzenie nowego spojrzenia na genealogię ich koncepcji. Śledząc historię pojęć obrazu psychicznego oraz archetypu, tekst rekonstruuje ewolucję ich myśli na kanwie dwóch jakościowych podejść psychologii: freudowskiej Metapsychologii (pierwotnie rozumianej jako psychoanalityczną naukę skoncentrowaną na zastąpieniu metafizyki) oraz diltheyowskiej Psychologii Realnej (deskryptywnej psychologii badającej aktywność duszy). Prezentowane studium skupia się na okresie 1912-1979 rozciągającym się od ustanowienia integralnej szkoły jungowskiej do ustanowienia przez (...) J. Hillmana Psychologii Archetypowej. Tak też niniejszy test ma na celu przedstawienie krytycznego i historycznego podejścia do psychologii głębi oraz psychologii obrazu. (shrink)

While we agree in broad strokes with the characterisation of rationalization as a “useful fiction,” we think that Fiery Cushman's claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: (1) the reality of beliefs and desires, that is, the fictional status of folk-psychological entities and (2) the degree to which they should be understood as useful. Our aim is to clarify both points and explicate the rationale of rationalization.

Let G be a group definable in a monster model $\germ{C}$ of a rosy theory satisfying NIP. Assume that G has hereditarily finitely satisfiable generics and 1 < U þ (G) < ∞. We prove that if G acts definably on a definable set of U þ -rank 1, then, under some general assumption about this action, there is an infinite field interpretable in $\germ{C}$ . We conclude that if G is not solvable-by-finite and it acts faithfully and definably on (...) a definable set of U þ -rank 1, then there is an infinite field interpretable in $\germ{C}$ . As an immediate consequence, we get that if G has a definable subgroup H such that U þ (G) = U þ (H) + 1 and $G/\bigcap _{g\in G}H^{g}$ is not solvable-by-finite, then an infinite field interpretable in $\germ{C}$ also exists. (shrink)

RésuméChaque science, c'est‐à‐dire chaque système, est formée d'un modèle et d'une théorie de la mesure permettant de la vérifier expérimentalement. Les modèles contemporains sont — pour la plupart — des théories déductives. Il existe toute une hiérarchie de systèmes de plus en plus larges: logique, arithmétique, théorie des probabilités , géométrie, cinématique, dynamique.Each science is formed by a model and a measure theory . Nearly all to‐day models are deductive theories. There exists a hierarchy of systems more and more extensive: (...) logics, arithmetics, theory of probability , geometry, kinematics, dynamics. (shrink)

The primary goal of this monograph is to justify the possibility of building a hybrid theory of normative ethics which can combine ethical consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics. The aim of the book is to demonstrate the possibility of constructing a synthetic theory from ethical traditions that are generally considered to be contradictory. In addition, I propose an outline of an original theory which tries to carry out such a synthesis. I call it Institutional Function Consequentialism. The justification for a (...) hybrid theory of normative ethics requires the resolution of certain meta-ethical issues. I discuss them in part 1.1. After a brief overview of my research aims I consider the answer to the following questions: “What kind of meta-ethical beliefs must we assume for normative ethics?” and "Why should we build ethical theories?". I also discuss the various forms of ethical scepticism, which should be rejected if we develop a hybrid theory of normative ethics. I also describe possible methods of justifying any ethical theory. At the end of part 1.1 I explain that the best method for justifying any ethical theory is the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In parts 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 I analyse three main types of normative ethics which are considered to be competitive: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. Part 1.2 is about consequentialism and its difference between utilitarianism and teleological theories. I also present the main reasons for the popularity of consequentialism. In part 1.3 I define deontology, present its variations and show important benefits that motivate its continuous growth. In part 1.4 I discuss virtue ethics, which is often referred as the viable alternative to consequentialism and deontology. If we want to build any new ethical theory, first we should describe the problems of the old ones. For this reason, in chapter 2 I describe the most important arguments against ethical consequentialism, and in chapter 3 I explain the difficulties of deontology. Critical remarks on virtue ethics are considered in part 1.4. The last two chapters directly concern the main aim of the monograph. Because in chapter 3 I show that deontology suffers from a number of problems such as the paradox of deontology, in chapters 4 and 5 I present only consequentialist versions of hybrid theories. These versions try to avoid the common pleas of utilitarianism and combine the advantages of opponents to utilitarianism. I answer the question (4.1) "What is hybrid consequentialism?" and briefly describe (4.2) the most important examples of hybrid theories by others. I discuss the prerogatives without restrictions idea by Samuel Scheffler, rule consequentialism by Brad Hooker, Kantian consequentialism by Richard M. Hare, David Cummiskey and Derek Parfit and consequentializing procedure proposed by Douglas W. Portmore. In the last chapter I present a new hybrid version of consequentialism that I call Institutional Function Consequentialism. I start from the thesis (5.1) that traditional meta-ethics of analytic philosophy incorrectly defines the main field of its research. Rather than focusing on the philosophy of language and metaphysics it should try to answer one question: “What should morality and ethics be for?”. Therefore I introduce an original methodology for meta-ethics that I call the Functional Model of Analysis (FMA). It is a meta-ethical framework in which the fundamental questions concern the practical functions of normative domains such as morality and ethics and the most rational way of achieving them. FMA is meta-ethical project that (a) explains the persistence of fundamental ethical disagreement among experts, (b) sets the background for explaining or justifying the correct structure of the ethical theory, (c) gives the possibility to create a hybrid theory of normative ethics. In part 5.2 I formulate a generalized argument against various popular theories of normative ethics which states that most of the popular theories are too narrow and one-sided, causing permanent dispute between them. There are many distinct practical functions of morality that are usually based on different types of normative theories such as Aristotelian ethics, utilitarianism, contractarianism and contractualism. In order to remove these conflicts, the correct ethical theory should try to take into account all of these relevant features of moral life. Unfortunately, most ethical theories are mono-functional. This means that their supporters consciously or unconsciously (1) recognize or accept only one genuine practical function, (2) think that this one practical function overrides all other practical functions or (3) try to reduce all practical functions to the one that is chosen. In part 5.2 I present a description and justification of a new normative account that I call Hybrid Function Consequentialism. The formal scheme of this consequentialism can be summarized in the following way: we should act according to some important focal points P1…Pn with contents C1…Cn that are selected on the basis of considerations about which kind of P with C will bring the best realization of the best mix of normative functions F1...Fn. In the next part (5.2.2) I present the new way of “consequentializing” particular theories of normative ethics by applying the scheme of Hybrid Function Consequentialism. As an example of the use of this procedure, I formulate perfectionist virtue consequentialism, contractarian institution consequentialism, contractualist rule consequentialism and consequentialism of salvation. In part 5.3 I formulate an original theoretical concept that I call Institutional Function Consequentialism (IFC). It is a hybrid theory that is based on the previously described Functional Model of Analysis and a reflection on the role of institutions in modern developed societies. IFC claims that we should always act according to some rules, virtues, motives and intentions that constitute the homeostasis of normative institutions whose internalization by the overwhelming majority of each new generation has maximum expected value in terms of the best realization of the equilibrium of the most important practical functions of normative domains. Responsibility and sanctions related to wrongful actions should be dependent on the particular institution whose standards have been violated. IFC has several unique features which are described and justified in part 5.3. It is a form of hybrid consequentialism – it mixes features of consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics. It does this on three different levels: justification, structure and content. The main focal point of the theory is not rules or virtues, but normative institutions. Values to be optimized in the framework of consequentialism are not "happiness", "well-being" or "preferences", but the fulfilment of normative functions. IFC is not limited to the field of ethics only, but it is a meta-normative account of justification for an entire social order which is comprised of a number of different institutions. It also assumes a specific, circular relationship between practical ethics (e.g. research on such important issues as civil disobedience, fair distribution of wealth, philosophy of punishment or autonomy of conscience), and the content of the general rules that may constitute the optimal homeostasis of institutions. It rejects the simplistic belief that moral thinking is based solely on deductive implications from general ethical principles or meta-ethical beliefs. (shrink)

For a NIP theory T, a sufficiently saturated model ${\mathfrak C}$ of T, and an invariant (over some small subset of ${\mathfrak C}$ ) global type p, we prove that there exists a finest relatively type-definable over a small set of parameters from ${\mathfrak C}$ equivalence relation on the set of realizations of p which has stable quotient. This is a counterpart for equivalence relations of the main result of [2] on the existence of maximal stable quotients of type-definable groups (...) in NIP theories. Our proof adapts the ideas of the proof of this result, working with relatively type-definable subsets of the group of automorphisms of the monster model as defined in [3]. (shrink)

In the recent years we can observe a sort of renaissance of the philosophy of mathematics. More and more papers and books are published. A few years ago a new journal (Philosophia Mathematica) devoted exclusively to the philosophy of mathematics started appearing. In the contemporary discussions - especially in the context of the question of the applicability of mathematics to the description of the physical world - the issue of the existence and the ontological status of mathematical objects plays a (...) particular role. Many new conceptions have appeared - both realistic and antirealistic. In the paper one of the antirealistic conceptions formulated in the recent years is presented - namely a conception by C. Chihara [1990]. The author rejects both Gödel's and Quine's arguments for the realistic standpoint. First, these standpoints will be briefly summarised, since they play a significant role in the contemporary philosophy of mathematics - and are particularly important in the context of the discussion upon Chihara's conception. Next, Chihara's arguments will be analysed in detail. As a result it will turn out that these arguments are not conclusive. Chihara's system relies on certain unjustified assumptions. Moreover, the philosophical difficulties that it encounters are not sufficiently discussed. (shrink)

We will prove that there exists a model of ZFC+"c = ω 2 " in which every $M \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ of cardinality less than continuum c is meager, and such that for every $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ of cardinality c there exists a continuous function f: R → R with f[X] = [0, 1]. In particular in this model there is no magic set, i.e., a set $M \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ such that the equation f[M] = g[M] implies f = g for (...) every continuous nowhere constant functions f, g: R → R. (shrink)

S'opposant à la clôture hégélienne de la négativité, c'est-à-dire à l'esclavage intériorisé et affirmé par l'homme posthistorique, Bataille définit l'homme en tant que l'être ontologiquement déchiré, constitué par le conflit incontournable pouvant être enlevé non par un moment quelconque de l'histoire, mais uniquement par la mort. Contrairement à la prise de position hégélienne mystifiée l'homme n'est pas, selon Bataille, exclusivement une conscience tout à fait temporalisée, mais aussi un corps et une impulsion ou bien une emanation personifiée de l'énergie cosmique (...) et solaire. En tant que tel il est une négativité par excellence, une tension notoire entre l'interdit et le projet d'une part et la transgression et le dépense anarchique de l'autre, donc un être convulsif orienté non vers la plénitude positivement défini, mais vers la perte. Plus que par les avantages de la culture rejetant la violence et diminuant une existence devenant plus en plus utilisée et fonctionnalisée, l'homme est instigué, selon Bataille, par le sacré qui détermine originairement la dynamique de la vie. Attiré par le sacré en tant que le revers de l'homogénéité de la culture l'homme se dirige vers l'existence tragique souveraine, aspire à l'impossible. Aux système, savoir, possibilités, histoire et vie miasmatique excluant l'extase qui pour la raison n'est rien ou est par elle au moins tout à fait instrumentalisée dans la stratégie de sa ruse, Bataille oppose l'impossible athéologique et asystématique ou bien le non-savoir en tant que régions où se manifeste la souveraineté de l'homme. La souveraineté paradoxale du point de vue des codes pragmatiques, parce que fondée non sur le choix assidu et avare de l'accumulation et de la durée, mais sur le choix excessif de la perte, rudimentaire pour la vie traitée comme une explosion dionysiaque ou solaire. (shrink)

The dilemma referred to in the title occurs in many contexts concerned with expressive meaning in art, and especially music, which suggests that the issue it raises will be central to any complete theory of musical expressiveness. One notable attempt to resolve the paradox of simultaneous generality and particularity in music is in Aaron Ridley’s book Music, Value and the Passions. I show why I consider his account unsatisfactory and then propose my own resolution of the paradox. It takes the (...) form of distinguishing between two distinct notions of generality (which I term ‘generality’ and ‘abstractness’) and of particularity (‘specificity’ and ‘concreteness’), and of constructing two relatively independent oppositions: the concrete versus the abstract and the specifi c versus the general. Finally, I show that a description of music’s expressive meaning as abstract, but specific, rightly captures what is usually thought about music, and does not entail any contradictions. (shrink)

According to the PCCP thesis, the probability of a conditional A → C is the conditional probability P. This claim is undermined by Lewis’ triviality results, which purport to show that apart from trivial cases, PCCP is not true. In the present article we show that the only rational, “Dutch Book-resistant” extension of the agent’s beliefs concerning non-conditional sentences A and C to the conditional A → C is by assuming that P = P. In other cases a diachronic Dutch (...) Book against the agent can be constructed. There is a tension between our findings and Lewis’ results, which needs to be explained. Therefore, we present a probability space which corresponds in a natural way to the diachronic Dutch Book—and which allows the conditional A → C to be interpreted as an event in a mathematically sound way. It also allows to formalize the notion of conditionalizing A → C on ¬C which plays a crucial role in Lewis’ proof. Our conclusion is that Lewis’ proof is circular, so it cannot be considered to be a sound argument against PCCP. (shrink)

The Turing test, which is a verbal test of the indistinguishability of machine and human intelligence, is a historically important idea that has set a way of thinking about the AI (artificial intelligence) project that is still relevant today. According to it, the benchmark/blueprint for AI is human intelligence, and the key skill of AI should be its communicative proficiency – which includes explaining decisions made by the machine. Passing the original Turing test by a machine does not guarantee that (...) the machine is, from the point of view of a human, trustworthy; on the contrary, the idea of a machine capable of “fooling” or “outsmarting” a human is inherent within the concept of the test. We postulate, that a test that guarantees a high level of trust should be: a) non-imitative, b) non-behavioral, c) focused on the ability to explain, taking into account, however, the design and rules of operation of the machine (and not just human expectations), d) focused on the machine’s ability to learn. (shrink)

We analyze three interesting arguments from the literature, where ascribing a probability of 1 to a certain right-nested conditional A→(B→C) leads to strong theses concerning conditionals: they serve as counterexamples to important general claims. The first is the classic and much discussed McGee’s counterexample to Modus Ponens from McGee [“A Counterexample to Modus Ponens.” The Journal of Philosophy 82 (9): 462–471]. The second example was given by Santorio [“Trivializing Informational Consequence.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104:297–320] and is intended to undermine (...) the probabilistic version of Modus Ponens. The third example was presented in Cantwell [“Revisiting McGee’s Probabilistic Analysis of Conditionals.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (5): 973–1017] in order to reject the general version of the Ramsey Test (i.e. PCCP) and Modus Ponens. These examples are based on a specific interpretation of right-nested conditional which is not the only possible one. We provide examples demonstrating that alternative interpretations are feasible. As a result, the arguments presented in the three cited works possess limited efficacy, as they are confined solely to the particular interpretation of the conditional. (shrink)

C W Evers, J C Walker; Knowledge, Partitioned Sets and Extensionality: a refutation of the forms of knowledge thesis, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume.

The paper considers main features of two groups of logics for biological devices, called Physarum Chips, based on the plasmodium. Let us recall that the plasmodium is a single cell with many diploid nuclei. It propagates networks by growing pseudopodia to connect scattered nutrients. As a result, we deal with a kind of computing. The first group of logics for Physarum Chips formalizes the plasmodium behaviour under conditions of nutrient-poor substrate. This group can be defined as standard storage modification machines. (...) The second group of logics for Physarum Chips covers the plasmodium computing under conditions of nutrient-rich substrate. In this case the plasmodium behaves in a massively parallel manner and propagates in all possible directions. The logics of the second group are unconventional and deal with non-well-founded data such as infinite streams. (shrink)

Contents: Leszek NOWAK, Marcin PAPRZYCKI: Introduction. ON THE NATURE OF SOCIAL SYSTEM. Ulrich K. PREUSS: Political Order and Democracy. Carl Schmitt and his Influence. Katarzyna PAPRZYCKA: A Paradox in Hobbes' Philosophy of Law. Stephen L. ESQUITH: Democratic Political Dialogue. Edward JELINSKI: Democracy in Polish Reformist Socialist Thought. Katarzyna PAPRZYCKA: The Master and Slave Configuration in Hegel's System. Maurice GODELIER: Lévi-Strauss, Marx and After. A reappraisal of structuralist and Marxist tools for analyzing social logics. Krzysztof NIEDZWIADEK: On the Structure of (...) Social System. Waldemar CZAJKOWSKI: Social Being and Its Reproduction. ON RATIONALITY AND CAPTIVITY. Marek ZIO??L??KOWSKI: Power and Knowledge. Leszek NOWAK: Two Inter-Human Limits to the Rationality of Man. Marcin PAPRZYCKI: The non-Christian Model of Man. An Attempt at a Psychoanalytic Explanation. Robert EGIERT: Toward the Sophisticated Rationalistic Model of Man. ON SOCIAL REVOLUTION. Leszek NOWAK: Revolution is an Opaque Progress but a Progress Nonetheless. Katarzyna PAPRZYCKA, Marcin PAPRZYCKI: How Do Enslaved People Make Revolutions? Grzegorz TOMCZAK: Is It Worth Winning a Revolution? Krzysztof BRZECHCZYN: Civil Loop and the Absorption of Elites. Richard C. MCCLEARY: What Makes Marxist Historical Materialism Objective? Grzegorz KOTLARSKI: Classes and Masses in Social Philosophy of Rosa Luxemburg. ON REAL SOCIALISM. Ernest GELLNER: The Civil and the Sacred. Witold MARCISZEWSKI: Economics and the Idea of Information. Why socialism must have collapsed? Leszek NOWAK, Katarzyna PAPRZYCKA, Marcin PAPRZYCKI: On Multilinearity of Socialism. Achim SIEGEL: The Overrepression Cycle in the Soviet Union. An Operationalization of a Theoretical Model. Krzysztof BRZECHCZYN: The State of the Teutonic Order as a Socialist Society. DISCUSSIONS. Richard MCCLEARLY: Socioanalysis and Philosophy. W??l??odzimierz HELLER: The Public and the Private in Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy. Methodological Remarks. Krzysztof BRZECHCZYN: Unsuccessful Conquest and Successful Subordination. A contribution to the theory of intersocial relations. (shrink)

Poznawalność jako modalność de re: pewne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha W artykule staramy się znaleźć nowe, intuicyjne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha. Twierdzimy, że tradycyjne wyrażenie zasady poznawalności opiera się na błędnym rozumieniu poznawalności jako modalności de dicto. Zamiast tego proponujemy rozumieć poznawalność jako modalność de re. W artykule przedstawiamy minimalną logikę poznawalności, w której zasada poznawalności jest ważna, ale paradoks Fitcha już nie obowiązuje. Logikę charakteryzujemy semantycznie, a także poprzez podejście aksjomatyczne i tabelaryczne.